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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to examine if, and under what conditions, democracy promotes 
education. The investigation is based on theoretical models where the level of income, income 
inequality and ethnical fractionalization are assumed to affect the impact democracy has on the 
level of education in a country. Based on panel data, regression analyses are performed with the 
level of education as the dependent variable. For quality purposes two separate measurements are 
used for the democracy and education variables respectively. The empirical results support the 
relationship between secondary school enrollment rate and democracy while government spending 
on education shows little correlation with democracy. Further, the results indicate that low income 
levels in a country lowers the effect democracy has on education. 
  
Keywords: Democracy, Education, Median Voter Theorem, Lipset Hypothesis, Political 
Imperfections, Regression Analysis 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Democracy has spread over the world since the third wave of democratization started in the 
1970s (Huntington, 1992). The transitions into democracy have taken different forms and 
been caused by different reasons. The subject is more topical than ever with the politics the 
USA has executed during the last decade in Iraq and Afghanistan under the command of 
George W. Bush. In the same way as many former colonies were introduced to democracy 
in the 1950s, the current world situation shows many cases where outside parties have 
pushed for a transition. The neoconservative view is characterized by the conviction that 
western style democracy is the superior form of political system (Fukuyama, 2006). It is 
however important to question if democracy always gains everyone in a country. As 
knowledge is a cornerstone in the democratic society, it is commonly argued that 
democracy favors education and knowledge.  
Democracy is based on the idea that the citizens of a country should make the important 
decisions, hence they need to know what they shall make decisions about. Already 
Aristotle recognized that a functioning state needs educated people. He states that “…the 
legislator should direct his attention above all to the education of youth, for the neglect 
does the constitution harm” (Aristotle, 350BC, Politics, Book Eight, Part 1). Education 
promotes democracy since people can make better voting decisions and it is therefore a 
cornerstone in a functioning and stable democracy (Lipset, 1959). If autocracy is 
dictatorship by the rich, democracy can be described as dictatorship by the poor and 
middle class. Since education is the best way for parents to improve the chances of a better 
future for their children (Keefer et al. 2004) democracy should gain the level of education 
in a country (Besley et al. 2006). 
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether democracy has a positive impact on 
the level of education in a country.  
In chapter 2 the paper begins with giving a background to the subject and an overview of 
related literature to frame the question in a proper context. Chapter 3 gives a theoretical 
background followed by a data overview in chapter 4. Chapter 5 and 6 give a presentation 
of the utilized methodology and empirical results. Lastly, the paper is concluded and some 
final remarks are given.  
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2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED LITERATURE  
As mentioned, section 2.1 gives a background to the topic of democracy and education. 
The first fundamental question to cover is whom democracy favors. This is followed by 
reasoning on whether education is important and why it is of greatest value for the poor. 
Section 2.2 covers previous research on democracy and on the relationship with the level 
of education. Three articles that cover the relationship is presented to give an overview of 
frequently used methods and the results they achieve.  
2.1 Background 
One of the greatest advocates of democracy is Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen. He argues 
that “Politically unfree citizens –whether rich or poor – are deprived of a basic liberty and 
of a fundamental constituent of good living” (2004, p10). He also emphasizes that not only 
economic growth matters to people, and highlights that democracy provides a security to 
people by letting them hold the rulers accountable for their decisions. Thus politicians, 
who are elected by the people, have greater incentives to follow the desires of the voters in 
order to be reelected. This argument implies that democracy will mean better conditions 
for the poor, which Sen illustrates with the fact that there has never been a major famine in 
a democratic country (1999).  
Moreover, education is valuable for parents as it gives their children better opportunities 
for a good future (Keefer et al. 2004). High quality teachers and closeness to school are 
therefore high priorities for low-income parents who cannot afford private schooling or 
send their children abroad. Since the lower and middle income classes constitute the 
majority of voters in a country, democratic societies should spend more money on 
schooling, and in the long run provide better education and achieve higher school 
attendance and literacy rates. 
In line with Sen there is a trend in the related academic literature indicating that democracy 
favors the poor (Gradstein, 2002). Meltzer et al. (1981) believe that a majority ruled 
democracy will automatically improve the situation for the poor, while authoritarian 
regimes favor the elites.  
However, a criticism to the surveys on democracy’s effect on the poor is that most datasets 
available are skewed. Ross (2006) claims that most successful non-democracies are 
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excluded from the surveys, the reason being that successful authoritarian regimes have 
little incentives to report data. Meanwhile, poorer authoritarian regimes report data in order 
to be entitled support from agencies such as World Bank, IMF or UNDP. Consequently 
most analyses conducted on the subject are based on skewed datasets and hence not fully 
reliable.  
2.2 Related Literature 
There is an extensive amount of academic literature dedicated to the relationship between 
democracy and economic growth (Haan et al. 2005, Heliwell 1994, Przeworski et al. 
1993). A different way to investigate how democracy affects a country is to study the 
relationship between democracy and human development. The literature on this subject is 
narrower, although there are a growing number of studies on the relationship between 
democracy and human health (Kudamatsu, 2009; Besley et al. 2006, Franco et al. 2004). 
The relationship between democracy and education is covered in several articles where the 
opposite direction is examined; if education raises the probability of democratization 
(Glaeser et al. 2006). There is however little research done on the effects democracy has on 
the level of education, where the method of studying one continent is most common. This 
is illustrated by a review of Stasavage (2005) who examines how multiparty elections 
affect educational spending in Africa. Another common method is to cover the impact 
democracy has on human development, including a measure of education as a dependent 
variable. Two articles using this approach in different ways are reviewed. Vollmer et al. 
(2009) examine democracy’s impact on literacy rates and life expectancy, controlling for 
other variables that may affect the impact. Tsai (2006) studies the impact democracy has 
on educational opportunities and physical well-being in developing countries.  
Government spending: Continent Study 
Stasavage (2005) studies the relationship between multiparty elections and governmental 
spending on education in Africa during the 1990s. Data for electoral competition is 
gathered from the Africa Research Program at Harvard University and data for government 
spending is compiled from the World Bank Development Indicators covering the time span 
1980-1996. The issue of data availability is a problem that Stasavage considers when 
drawing conclusions. Stasavage performs OLS and fixed effect regressions, controlling for 
logged GDP, Aid, rate of rural population and rate of population under 15 years. The 
results indicate that many countries initiated steps towards democracy during the period for 
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the study and that the introduction of multiparty elections was positively correlated with 
higher levels of government spending on education and on redistribution (2005) He further 
showed that the increased educational spending was mainly directed towards primary 
school while the university funding was unaffected. In line with Stasavage, Brown and 
Hunter (1999) emphasize that democratic countries tend to spend more on education and 
health than autocracies in Latin America.  
Human Development: Literacy Rates 
Vollmer et al. (2009) study democracy’s effect on non-income dimensions of human 
development. They measure human development as literacy rate and life expectancy. A 
cross-section time-series FGLS regression analysis is performed covering the period 1970-
2003. The regressions include interaction variables to check for the impact income, 
inequality, fractionalization and literacy have on democracy’s effect on human 
development. The authors reach the results that democracy has a positive impact on the 
literacy rate. Among the explanatory variables their results show that income level has a 
positive impact, inequality is not significant and ethnic fractionalization has a negative 
impact on the literacy rate. The interaction variables included are not significant, indicating 
that democracy has a positive impact on human development, independently of economic 
development, ethnic fractionalization and education.  
Human Development: Educational Opportunities 
Tsai (2006) studies the impact democracy has on human development in developing 
countries. He uses two separate categories for human development; physical well-being 
and educational opportunities. The educational opportunities indicator is measured as 
primary school enrollment rate, rate of completing fifth grade and secondary school 
enrollment rate. He performs least absolute error regressions to allow outliers less 
influence over the results. Tsai further examines the rate of change in human development, 
measured as the level of human development 1995 - 1998 compared to 1975-1984. Lastly 
he controls for government spending on education as a percentage of GNP. The results 
show that the levels of education were significantly and clearly higher in democracies than 
in autocracies. The correlation between secondary school enrollment rate and income level 
was positive and significant while government spending on education was small and 
weakly significant. Tsai found that autocracies had faster improvement in enrollment rates 
for primary and secondary school than the democratic and semi-authoritarian countries did, 
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although he recognizes that most autocracies started out at lower levels of enrollment rates, 
making it easier to achieve high improvement rates. Democracies and semi-authoritarian 
countries did spend more money on education, but the greater amounts spent did not result 
in greater educational achievements, indicating a greater focus on universities (2006).  
2.3 Summary 
There is little doubt about the value of democracy and the freedom and power it gives the 
citizens. A democratic society should give the low and middle class in a country more 
power and gain their needs since they form a majority. Public services such as education 
are of great value for those who cannot afford private alternatives. According to these 
arguments education should be prioritized in democracies. Empirical research has 
supported these lines of argumentation, but concern should be directed to the reliability and 
quality of the data that the papers are based on.  
Three articles with different approaches were reviewed to give a picture of the related 
literature covering democracies impact on education. The authors agree that democratic 
countries show higher levels of education, whether measured as literacy rate, government 
spending on education or school attendance rate. This holds for analyses with or without 
high-income countries and covering only one continent or the whole world. The impact 
democracy has on education and the reasons behind it are however disputed. Vollmer et al. 
and Stasavage emphasized a positive correlation between democracy and education. In 
contrast, Tsai rather found that autocracies had faster improvement in enrollment rates than 
the democratic and semi-authoritarian countries did. Stasavage and Tsai both reached the 
results that democratic governments spend more money on education than autocracies. The 
composition of the higher level of educational spending is however not clear, Stasavage 
found that it was mainly directed to primary school while Tsai found that the money was 
allocated to universities. Vollmer et al. found that the impact of democracy on human 
development is independent of parameters such as income, inequality and ethnic 
fractionalization. Their dependent variable for education is measured as literacy rate. This 
parameter could be seen as a weakness since it needs longer time spans to be affected than 
enrollment rates since it measures the education level of the entire adult population.  
This paper contributes to the existing research in the field by exploring the effect of 
democracy on education covering the whole world. Secondary school enrollment rate is 
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used as a proxy for education. This will allow for detecting changes on education quicker 
than literacy rates allows for. Still the quality of the schooling is controlled for as parents 
do not send their children to secondary school if the primary school was of bad quality. 
Furthermore, not only secondary school enrollment rates will be taken into account but 
also the government spending on education. In the next section a theoretical framework is 
outlined to give a foundation for formulating the hypothesis that shall be tested in the 
empirical study. 
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3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In order to explore the possible effects democracy1 has on education it is crucial to 
establish a theoretical framework. The first part of the theoretical review will cover 
theories that explain how democracy affects education. This will be done by studying 
differences between autocracies’ and democracies’ incentives to invest in social services. 
As education is an important social service it is assumed to be covered in the theoretical 
argumentations concerning social services. The distributional aspects of democracy and the 
role of the poor are explained in the Median Voter Theorem. The second part of the 
theoretical review will cover parameters that may affect the impact democracy has on the 
level of education. The third part will cover the causality question related to the topic. 
3.1 Nature of Political Systems 
Olson (1993) presents a theory of economic incentives in autocracies and democracies. 
Olson assumes that political leaders, whether democratically elected or dictatorial act 
opportunistic. An autocrat therefore has incentives to encourage high productivity in his 
country, as this enables him to collect more from the people for his own use. Hence the 
autocrat does have incentives to provide the people with social services if he predicts that 
this will gain the productivity and thereby his own wealth.  
Even if democratically elected political leaders are just as interested in maximizing their 
own wealth the autocrat will extract more resources in tax than the democratic leaders will. 
The reason for this is that democratically elected politicians can reach the majoritarian 
support they need by promising greater wealth to a group of people. This group would 
suffer if the leaders extracted too large tax rates. The autocrat does not have any such 
restrictions since he needs to satisfy less people. Olson’s theory argues that autocrats do 
not always extract more from the people, but the extracted money in democratic societies 
is shared by the inhabitants. He does however point out that it is most often not distributed 
very equally (Olson, 1993).  
                                                             
1 According to the UN Democracy Fund the core concepts of democracy are the process where 
people elect their governments in periodic, transparent, free and fair elections. There should be 
political parties that form an opposition and hold the governing party accountable as well as a 
definition of the terms and conditions for the democratic governance and rule of law. Human 
rights, freedom of expression, access to information and transparency are further requirements in 
a democratic society (www.un.org/democracyfund/XSituatingDemocracy.htm). 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Moreover, a key difference between an autocratic and democratic society is the time 
horizon aspect. An autocrat has incentives to ensure investors and people that security and 
property rights are guaranteed for a long time horizon, since this promotes economic 
development. But since there is no independent judiciary that ensures who will succeed the 
dictator, a promise that stretches over long time is not credible. Autocrats are vulnerable to 
uncertainty about the future and this creates short-term views in autocratic societies. The 
time horizons for political leaders in democratic societies are often even shorter than the 
autocrats’ since the terms are fixed at a few years. But the rule of law2 ensures 
predictability of succession and thereby security of long term property rights and 
individual rights (Olson, 1993). If an autocrat is uncertain about the future or expects to be 
overthrown he will likely try to extract as much income as possible, ignoring long term 
investments in public services such as education. 
The model of distributive politics implies that incumbents in democratic political systems 
will provide more public services than will autocrats. An autocrat often relies on support 
from a small group of supporters with strong personal incentives, while democratically 
elected leaders needs a large number of citizens supporting them with weaker personal 
incentives (Glaeser et al. 2006). It is therefore cheaper for an autocrat to direct money 
directly towards the small group of supporters and for a democratic leader it is less costly 
to provide public services than give the many citizens money directly (Mesquita et al 
2002). Autocrats will only redistribute to the people for ideological reasons or to stay in 
power or increase his own wealth (Vollmer et al. 2009). 
The Median Voter Theorem  
The Median Voter Theorem is a public choice model on majority decision-making. The 
theory rests on the assumptions that all voters have single peaked preferences on a single 
dimension. This is a great simplification when it applies to national governmental 
elections, but the theory may give some insight in majoritarian decision-making. The 
Median Voter Theorem argues that if every voter in the society chooses the candidate or 
party closest to his own preferences the candidate that is closest to the median voter will 
                                                             
2 Rule of law means that there is an impartial judiciary and that the law applies to everybody. This means 
that the government is restrained by the law. Furthermore, the law is public which creates predictability for 
the citizens on how the country functions (World Bank, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTINST/ , 26 November 2009) 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win the election. The theorem argues that in equilibrium the government will maximize the 
welfare of the median voter (Rosen, 2005).  
Meltzer et al. (1981) argue that the income distribution in countries is skewed to the right. 
This means that the income of the median voter is lower than the income of the mean 
voter. In their argumentation they assume that the only governmental activities are 
redistribution and taxation and that voters are fully informed. These assumptions will lead 
to a government size that is optimal to the decisive individual. This individual could be a 
voter, a dictator or a marginal member of an elitist junta. In a country with universal 
suffrage and majority rule the mean voter is decisive. According to the median voter 
theorem, the level of redistribution and public services will be the level that is optimal to 
the median voter. Since the income redistribution in countries is skewed to the right social 
services which benefit the poor should be extensive in democracies (Meltzer et al. 1981). 
3.2 Parameters that Affect the Impact Democracy has on Education 
This section will give a framework to variables that may affect the impact democracy has 
on the level of education. The Lipset Hypothesis outlines how the income level may affect 
the results of democracy. Political imperfections are presented as a possible explanation to 
the functioning of democracy. 
The Lipset Hypothesis 
Lipset argues that wealth in a country, meaning a low amount of real poor people, is a 
prerequisite for a functioning democracy. This is because only then could the mass 
intelligently choose responsible and democratic leaders (1959). The Lipset Hypothesis is 
empirically supported by Benhabib et al, who show that democracy has higher 
representation and is more stable in developed countries (2006). The authors explain this 
fact with richer countries having more to lose on introducing autocracy. In a high income 
country the richest will value freedom over authoritarian regimes that promise lower tax 
rates. Hence, democracy survives in richer countries. On the other hand, if you are poor in 
a low-income country, the value of more money might exceed the value of freedom. 
According to a UNDP report (2004) the majority asked in a survey in Latin America said 
that they would prefer autocracy to democracy if it means improving their economic 
situation (Ross, 2006). 
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Imperfections on the Political Market 
As presented above the Median Voter Theorem says that the median voter is decisive and 
since the income distribution in most countries is skewed to the right there should be great 
spending on social services such as education to the benefit of poor. Keefer et al. argue that 
this model does not hold and point out that there is not more redistribution in countries 
with high levels of income inequality. The number of countries that have competitive 
elections has risen dramatically during the 1990s and a great proportion of these new 
voters have low incomes. The introduction of elections does however not necessarily affect 
the poor positively; often the governments do not focus on policies that affect the poor. 
Keefer et al. argue that the theorem does not hold due to imperfections on the political 
market. Since public services such as education are most sensitive to those imperfections, 
the poor will be affected to a greater extent. They present three political imperfections that 
may affect the extent to which democracy favors the poor (2004).  
Firstly, lack of information about how the politicians perform impedes the voters to hold 
politicians accountable and punish those who are governing badly. This will lead to higher 
levels of rent-seeking3 among politicians instead of providing services to the people. 
Putting this in the context of education, the reason why the quality of schooling is not a 
preferred target by many politicians is the difficulty to measure and hence it is hard to take 
credit for. Furthermore, the time horizons are long, schooling needs a few years to show 
results; it is not until literacy is achieved that the positive results from improved education 
can be noticed. By that time the politician who introduced the education program may no 
longer be in office. Governments generally prefer spending money on targeted programs 
rather than on maintenance and hence building a new school in a certain area are more 
interesting for a politician than spending money on restoring the existing ones in other 
areas (Keefer et al. 2004). 
Secondly, social fragmentation makes voters loyal to politicians from a certain group. 
Ethnical, religious and linguistic belongings affect the voting behavior to a great extent. 
Citizens that base their voting decision on such grounds are less able to hold their 
politicians accountable and will often stay loyal to the politician or political party even if 
they perform poorly. Polarized voting should affect the levels of social services negatively 
                                                             
3 Rent-seeking: diversion of economic resources for the benefit of political decision makers (Keefer, 2005. 
p6). 
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since the political focus is turned towards other matters (Keefer et al. 2004). Alesina et al. 
(2003) show that democracy is inversely related to ethnic fractionalization. They argue that 
ethnic fragmentation lowers the positive impact democracy has on the level of education, 
since it is harder for a government to introduce social services. In less fractionalized 
countries the democratic rule is stronger since there are fewer conflicts to take into 
account.   
Thirdly, political promises lacking credibility makes the incumbents safer in their 
positions and this will increase their rent-seeking. If voters are not able to monitor if good 
quality social services are provided, politicians are likely to spend less on such posts. If 
voters are aware of the difficulty in monitoring the politicians, they will not believe in 
politicians who make pre-election promises on providing more and better social services. 
When political promises lack credibility the elections become less efficient in holding 
incumbents accountable, and it becomes difficult for newcomers to enter the political 
market. Furthermore, when promises of better social services are not credible politicians 
will be better off promising a smaller group of voters more. This is referred to as the 
“patron-client” relationship in the literature (Keefer et al. 2004). 
These imperfections on the political market make it less likely that the voters elect 
responsible governments (Keefer et al. 2004). The need to constantly chase voters for the 
upcoming elections may create inefficient politicians and force them to short term 
solutions. This can lead to inefficient governments where important investments, which 
give no quick results, are neglected and cheap ways to buy voters are prioritized. 
3.3 Causality  
There is a strong correlation between the level of education and democracy (Glaeser et al. 
2006). Education raises the probability that people support democratic ideals and 
institutions (Kamens, 1988). The explanation for why education promotes democracy is 
according to Lipset that it broadens people’s minds, restrains them from joining extremist 
leaders and increases the capacity to vote rationally (1959). Higher educated people are 
more likely to be active citizens and participate politically; hence there is a positive 
relation between introduced compulsory schooling and voter turnout. Democracies with a 
high level of education are more enduring than democracies with low levels of education 
15 
 
(Glaeser et al. 2006). The effect education has on democracy means that there is a causality 
question. This relationship will be further discussed in the method section.  
3.4 Summary 
Democracy allows citizens to choose the leaders who offer the best governing. It also 
enables them to hold the politicians accountable and punish those who are governing 
badly. Providing education for their children is the best way for poor parents to improve 
the chances of a better future for their children. Therefore schooling is expected to be high 
on the political agenda in democratic countries. 
Autocrats and democratically elected leaders are both assumed to act out of self-interest. 
Both types of leaders would therefore have incentives to provide education if they believe 
that it gains the productivity and thereby their own wealth. However, an important 
difference between the types of political systems is that there is no independent judiciary to 
guarantee the succession or the security of the autocrat. An autocrat who does not expect to 
stay in office for a long time will likely not prioritize long term investments such as 
education. The implication of the Model of Distributive Politics is that autocrats often 
relies on small groups of supporters and is therefore able to compensate them directly. 
Meanwhile, democratically elected leaders need a broader group of supporters and it will 
therefore be less costly to provide public services than compensating each individual 
citizen. The Median Voter Theorem implies that in a democratic country the median voter 
is decisive. Since the income distribution in most countries is skewed to the right, social 
services such as education should be prioritized in democracies.  
These theoretical arguments speak for democracy having a positive impact on the level of 
education and on the government spending on education. However, there are factors that 
influence the extent to which democracy affects the level of education. The Lipset 
Hypothesis implies that a certain level of income is a prerequisite for a functioning 
democracy. Accordingly, a rich country values freedom higher than poor countries where 
many people struggle for survival.   
Imperfections on the political market may hinder the functioning of the median voter being 
decisive and consequently make it less likely that voters elect responsible governments. 
Lack of information about the politicians’ performances and focus on ethnical, religious or 
regional political matters contributes to irresponsible politicians being elected. 
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Consequently, less money is directed towards public services, such as education, to the 
benefit of the poor.  
Based on the theoretical arguments presented above, I expect democracy to give higher 
school enrollment rates and greater government expenditure directed towards schooling. I 
further expect that the level of income, income inequality and social fragmentation affect 
how democracies perform in providing schooling. From these lines of argument the 
following hypothesizes can be concluded: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Democratic countries promote education more than non-democracies do.  
Hypothesis 2: Social fragmentation lowers the impact democracy has on the level of 
education.  
Hypothesis 3: The greater the income inequality, the greater impact democracy has on the 
level of education. 
Hypothesis 4: Low income level in a country will have a negative effect on democracy’s 
impact on education. Lower income level means that there is less to redistribute.  
The listed hypothesizes will be tested in an empirical model. The next section presents the 
data that used for this purpose.  
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4. DATA 
To investigate the hypothesis of the paper the theoretical arguments presented in chapter 3 
are applied on empirical data. The first section in this chapter presents the variables and 
data availability. The following section gives an overview of the data and relates it to the 
hypothesizes.  
4.1 Data Availability 
The study covers the period 1975-2005, providing data in 5 year intervals. As the paper 
studies the impact democracy has on the level of education it is crucial to include only self-
governing states. The UN list of member nations, consisting of 193 countries is therefore 
utilized to select the sampling population for the study. Full overview of data availability is 
shown in Table 1.  
The dependent variable in the regression is the level of education in a country. Two 
different measurements of this parameter will be used; government spending on education 
and secondary school enrollment rate. The government spending on education includes 
public and private schools, administration and subsidies for students. This expenditure is 
presented as percent of total government spending or as percent of GDP. The primary 
advantage for calculating education spending as a percentage of total government spending 
is that it is not affected by changes in relative prices in the economy and therefore simply 
reflects the priority of education from the government. Both measures are used in the 
regressions. The secondary school enrollment rate is presented as the ratio between the 
total number of students enrolled, independent on age, to the total number of children in 
the age group that corresponds to the secondary level of schooling. Consequently, figures 
greater than 100 percent are possible. Data for both educational variables are collected 
from the World Bank Development Indicators and averages for every 5 years are 
computed. 
The independent variable in focus for this paper is the level of democracy. It is not obvious 
how to measure the level of democracy since many different factors can be included in 
such an index. In order to optimize credibility of the dataset two separate democracy 
indexes will be used. The first is the GASTIL index, produced by Freedom House, which 
is a non-governmental organization that has rated the freedom and democracy in countries 
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since 1973. Countries are given two separate scores on political rights and civil liberties 
respectively. Each index is scaled from 1 to 7, where lower scores represent higher degrees 
of freedom. The average score is computed for each country and based on the following 
scale a freedom status is provided. Average scores between 1 and 2.5 means that the 
country is rates as “Free”, between 3 and 5.5 is rates as “Partly Free” and between 5.5 and 
7 is “Not Free”. (After 2003 the ratings where changed to “Partly Free” requiring scores 
between 3 and 5). The dataset covers between 149 and 189 countries for each year in the 
period covered in this study.  In order to make the Freedom house rankings comparable in 
the regressions I will convert “Not Free” to 1, “Partly Free” to 2 and “Free” to 3.  
The second dataset for democracy is the POLITY IV index. The index was developed by 
Ted Robert Gurr and it is a project that codes the authority characteristics in countries. It is 
currently produced by Center for Systemic Peace in conjunction with the Center for Global 
Policy. There is a dataset specially developed to suit time series analysis, named Polity 2, 
which will be used in the regression analysis. It consists of a combination of two datasets, 
ranking the level of democracy and autocracy respectively. The countries are graded on a 
negative 10 to 10 scale, where the lowest numbers represent fully institutionalized 
autocracies and high numbers are fully institutionalized democracies. The dataset measures 
democracy on three main characteristics; competitiveness of participation and open and 
free elections, institutional constrains on the exercise of power and civil liberties to all 
citizens. The greater span of scores, compared to the Freedom House ratings, enables 
smaller changes in political systems to show in the data. The number of countries available 
are however smaller in the Polity IV dataset, mainly due the exclusion of countries with 
less than 500.000 inhabitants.  
Three control variables are included in the regressions in order to check if they affect the 
impact democracy has on the level of education as well as checking for direct impacts on 
the dependent variable. A set of dummy variables will also be used in the analysis. The 
included explanatory variables are income, income inequality and social fractionalization. 
The income variable is included in the regression measured as GDP per capita in constant 
$US 2000, and it is given in thousands. Data is available from the World Bank and average 
levels of GDP per capita are computed for every five years in the period 1975 to 2005. The 
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data coverage is extensive, between 122 and 181 countries are reported for each 5 year 
period.  
As a proxy for income inequality in a country the Gini Coefficient is used. The greater the 
Gini Coefficient the greater the income inequality. The maximum value is one, which 
corresponds to one person receiving all income whereas zero, the lowest possible value, 
refers to all income earners receiving the same income. The Gini Coefficient is converted 
to percentage, between zero and 100, in the regression analysis. Data is collected from the 
World Bank Development Indicators. Since the data available from the World Bank is very 
limited before 1985, the dataset has been complemented with Gini values compiled by 
Deininger and Squire. The dataset is available at the World Bank website4 and only the 
values ranked as “high quality” are used. When both datasets cover the same year an 
average is computed. The two datasets values seem to fit very well when there is 
overlapping, indicating that they can be seen as good complements. The data covering 
income inequality is however not extensive and even with the complementary data the 
number of countries in each 5 year period is between 43 and 102.  
Furthermore, a dataset covering ethnical fractionalization is used as a proxy for social 
fractionalization. It is produced by Alesina et al. (2003) and ranges countries between zero 
and one. The score reflects the probability for two randomly chosen individuals from a 
country belonging to different ethnic groups, hence the higher the score the more ethnically 
fractionalized country. Data is collected over a great span of years (from 1979 to 2001) and 
from a wide range of national and international sources. Each country has only one value 
registered for the time period covered. Alesina et al. argue that in cross-country regressions 
covering 30 year horizons the ethnical score can be assumed to be consistent. Over longer 
periods different fertility rates across groups may change the ethnical fragmentation score. 
Changes in definitions of ethnical groups could also change the scores, but this factor is 
also assumed to be small enough to be ignored over a 30 year time horizon.  
Finally, a set of dummy variables is included in the regressions. Dummies for each year in 
the study are included to control for time trends. Dummies for high-income countries and 
middle-income countries are included based on the World Bank categorization. 
Furthermore regional dummies are included to control for neighboring effects and 
                                                             
4 http://go.worldbank.org/NUMCJERM60, 17 August 2009 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historical background. Regional belonging is collected from the World Bank 
categorization. A special dummy for former Soviet states is also included. 
A summarization of the data is displayed in Table 1. For each variable the following 
summary is presented; the number of observations, the variable means, standard deviation, 
minimum value and maximum value. A correlation matrix shows that there is not a high 
degree of multicollinearity. The results are displayed in Appendix 1. 
Table 1. Variable Summary N Mean St. Dev Min Max 
School 1136 57,94 34,02 0,60 156,48 
Gov spend (% of tot gov.spend) 898 14,72 5,45 0,598 35,64 
Govspend(% of gdp) 954 4,52 2,93 0,42 49,52 
Democracy (Freedomhouse) 1173 2,07 0,82 1 3 
Democracy (Polity 2) 1026 0,74 7,27 -10 10 
GDP/capita (in thousands) 1126 5250,88 8305,50 0,736 52857,8 
Gini 525 40,03 9,67 19,4 74,33 
Ethnic Fractionalization 1281 0,44 0,26 0 0,93 
 
4.2 Data Overview 
In Figure 1 the secondary school enrollment rate is described over time. A clear positive 
development has occurred since the beginning of the period. The other measurement of 
educational level; governmental spending on education, does not show the same positive 
trend. The percentage of the total amount of government spending has been constant over 
time (see Figure 2).  
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Figure 1. Secondary School Enrollment rate 
21 
 
 
Figure 3 shows changes in the world average democracy score over time. Despite some 
backdrops there is a clear positive trend over time. The same trend is present in the 
Freedom House dataset for democracy.  
 
Both democracy variables are lagged one time period, which corresponds to five years. 
This is to give democracy time to impact the level of education. The income variable, 
measured as GDP/capita in constant $US 2000 will be included in the regressions in 
logarithmic form. The reason for this is its exponential shape detected in the data overview. 
When the natural logarithm is used the span of the variable becomes smaller which makes 
it less sensitive to extreme values and independent of units. The Gini variable is given in 
percentage and the ethnic fractionalization variable lies between zero and one. In some 
regressions dummy variables are included to control for year effects or regional effects.  
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The variables will be denoted as follows in the regressions: 
DEMO (FH) = Freedom House Democracy index, lagged one time period 
DEMO (P2) = Polity 2 Democracy index, lagged one time period 
School = Secondary school enrollment rate 
Gov/GDP = Government spending on education as percent of GDP 
Gov/Tot = Government spending on education as percent of total government spending 
GDP = Log of GDP/capita in constant $US 2000 
Gini = Gini Coefficient 
Ethnic = Ethnical fractionalization 
4.3 Summary 
To explore the impact democracy has on education in an empirical analysis, data was 
collected for the variables that were relevant for the hypothesizes. In order to give the 
regressions reliability two and three separate indexes were used for democracy and 
education respectively.  
The data overview shows that democracy has spread throughout the world over the last 30 
years. The secondary school enrollment rates have also increased but the percentage of 
government spending spent on education does not display a clear trend.  
In the next section the methodology for the empirical analysis is presented.  
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5. METHODOLOGY 
To investigate the relationship between democracy and education a regression analysis is 
performed with education as the dependent variable and the level of democracy as 
explanatory. Since the level of education is assumed to depend on a number of variables in 
addition to democracy a multiple regression analysis is performed. In the first section the 
data is handled and the appropriate method is chosen based on data tests. The following 
section presents specifications for the models that is used.  
5.1 Method Choice 
The dataset contains information about the differences between countries. It furthermore 
contains information on how the variables have changed over time, giving the data time 
series information. This combination of cross sectional and time series data is named panel 
data, which can be expressed as 
yit = α + β´ Xit + γ z´it + εit ,  (1) 
where i=1,…, N denotes individuals (in this paper countries) and  t=1,…,T denotes time 
(in this paper five year intervals).  X’ denotes a vector of independent variables and α is a 
constant. Using panel data has several advantages. As a consequence of combining time 
series and cross sectional data there is more data to analyze and hence a greater variability. 
It further allows for heterogeneous countries (Harris et al, 2005). However, the structure of 
panel data also brings complications and errors that need to be addressed. Since there is 
missing data for countries in certain years the panel dataset in this study is unbalanced. 
The Classical Linear Regression Model (CLRM) is based on a set of assumptions 
concerning disturbances. Two of these assumptions are of relevance to study when dealing 
with panel data. Firstly, in the CLRM the variance of the error term ε is constant for all i: 
V(εi) = σ2 (2) 
When this assumption is violated it is called heteroskedasticity, which means the variance 
is unequal. This implies that the conditional distribution of each level of education 
corresponding to a given democracy score does not have the same variance. This violation 
is very common in cross sectional data since the countries included are of different sizes 
and income levels resulting in scale effects being present (Gujarati. 2006). To detect 
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whether there is heteroskedasticity in the dataset a Breusch-Pagan test is performed 
(Thomas. 2005). The null hypothesis says that the variance for the error term is zero. When 
this is true there are no random effects. The results from the test are shown in Appendix 2. 
The significant result in the test (p-value= 0.000) indicates that the null hypothesis should be 
rejected, suggesting that the dataset is heteroskedastic.  
Secondly, in the CLRM there is no autocorrelation between error terms εi and εj: 
Cov (εi,εj ) = 0 for all i ≠ j     (3) 
(Thomas. 2005, Gujarati. 2006). If this assumption is violated, and the error terms are 
related, meaning there is a relation between the error term in the current time period and in 
the previous period, this is called autocorrelation. In the context of this paper it means the 
disturbance term related to one year in a specific country is not influenced by, or related to 
any other year’s disturbance term for the same country. The First-order Auto Regressive 
Process models autocorrelation as: 
εt = ρεt-1 + ut , (4) 
where the error term in time period t depends on its own value in the previous time and on 
a random error term ut. The extent to which the past error term affects the current error 
term is reflected in the coefficient of autocorrelation, ρ. This coefficient can take on values 
between -1 and 1, where the value zero reflects no autocorrelation. The problem with 
related error terms is that the regression analysis tends to show too high R2 values, too low 
standard errors and too high significance to the β coefficients. The assumption of no serial 
correlation is commonly violated in time series data. A Durbin Watson test is performed to 
check if there is autocorrelation in the dataset. The Durbin-Watson statistic lies between 
zero and four; where the values zero and four correspond to perfect correlation and the 
value two corresponds to no autocorrelation. Durbin and Watson have provided upper and 
lower critical values for the d-statistic as recommendations for determining whether there 
is autocorrelation (Thomas. 2005, Gujarati. 2006). Since the Durbin Watson test does not 
hold for lagged variables, the regression uses a non-lagged democracy variable. The results 
of the test are shown in Appendix 3. The value of the Durbin Watson statistic is below one, 
indicating that there is autocorrelation present in the dataset.  
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The tests for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation through the Breusch-Pagan test and the 
Durbin-Watson test respectively have shown that both are present. With autocorrelation 
and heteroskedasticity the OLS estimators are still consistent and unbiased, however they 
are inefficient and standard errors are likely to be biased (Gujarati. 2006). To handle the 
autocorrelation and the heteroskedasticity present in my panel dataset I will use a data 
transformer and then apply OLS to the transformed data. This will be done by using 
Generalized Least Squares (GLS) (Gujarati, Thomas).  
5.2 Summary 
Based on the hypothesises drawn in the theory section I expect the following results in the 
empirical data:  
Hypothesis 1: Democratic countries promote education more than non-democracies do.  
The democracy variable is expected to have a positive coefficient in the regressions.  
Hypothesis 2: Social fragmentation lowers the impact democracy has on the level of 
education.   
The interaction variable between democracy and ethnical fractionalization is expected to 
be negative.  
Hypothesis 3: The greater the inequality the greater impact democracy has on the level of 
education.  
The interaction variable between democracy and income inequality is expected to be 
positive.  
Hypothesis 4: Low income level in a country will have a negative effect on democracy’s 
impact on education, as low income level means that there less to redistribute.  
Income is expected to have a positive coefficient in the regressions. I also expect the 
middle and high income dummies to have positive coefficients.  
In the next section the model specifications are outlined and the results presented. 
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6. MODEL SPECIFICATIONS AND RESULTS 
A GLS random effects model is performed followed by the same regression specifications 
but with fixed effects. Further, a model where interaction variables are included is 
presented. Lastly, to handle the question of causality between democracy and education a 
cross lagged model is used.  
All regressions are performed in the econometric software Stata. The R2 values indicate the 
percentage of the variation in the dependent variable that can be attributed to variations in 
the independent variables. In the tables a 90% significance level is indicated by (*), a 95% 
significance level is indicated by (**) and a 99% significance level is indicated by (***).  
6.1 GLS, Random Effects Model 
The model takes the form 
Educationit = αit + β1Democracyi(t-1) + β2[Log(GDP)it] + β3Giniit + β4Ethnici + εit. 
 (5) 
The Ethnic Fractionalization variable does not have a time indicator since each country has 
the same value for the entire period in the study.  
Firstly the school enrollment rate depending on democracy is investigated. This is followed 
by the same regressions but using government spending as independent variable. Both 
regression sets are performed twice using Freedom House index in the first and Polity 2 
index in the second.  
School Enrollment Rate as Dependent Variable 
In the first regression secondary school enrollment rate is the dependent variable and 
democracy and income are independent. Step by step other variables and dummies are 
included. Results are displayed in Table 2. 
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Table 2. GLS random effects 
Dependent Variable: Secondary School enrollment rate 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Constant 32,540*** 41,889*** 66,450*** 70,551*** 39,256*** 35,919*** 51,711*** 58,532*** 
DEMO (FH) 3,811***  2,72**     -1,210  4,020***  
DEMO(P2)  1,084***  1,047***  0,029  1,026*** 
GDP 4,169*** 3,545*** 4,076*** 3,335*** 1,814*** 1,491*** 3,643*** 3,067*** 
Gini   -0,566*** -0,466*** -0,357*** -0,308 -0,238* -0,155 
Ethnic   -15,690** -17,914*** -17,183*** -18,398*** -4,683 4,345 
1985     4,111** 4,396**   
1990     9,722*** 10,027***   
1995     14,947*** 16,619***   
2000     23,749*** 23,031***   
2005     27,061*** 26,406***   
Sub Saharan Africa       -18,314*** -20,599*** 
Latin America       -10,653*** -13,209*** 
Former Soviet States       26,481*** 24,481*** 
South Asia       -6,819 -10,232* 
High Income     45,427*** 46,777***   
Middle Income     21,704*** 23,027***   
R2 0,594 0,606 0,631 0,622 0,723 0,696 0,722 0,740 
N 849 768 416 421 416 421 416 421 
 
The impact of democracy on school enrollment rate is positive and significant on all 
specifications but when the year and income level dummies are included. The coefficients 
for Freedom House are smaller than for the Polity 2 index for all regressions but number 5 
and 6 where the results are not statistically significant. The reason for the differences in 
size of the coefficients could be explained by that the Polity 2 index spans from -10 to 10 
while the Freedom House only spans form 1 to 3. The sign of the coefficients can however 
be compared. To interpret the democracy coefficient in specification (2), it means that a 
one-point increase in the democracy score is associated with a 1,084 percentage units raise 
in the school enrollment rate.  
As expected the estimated coefficient on logged GDP/capita is positive and significant for 
all specifications indicating that income level has a positive impact on secondary school 
enrollment rate. Since the income variable is included in logged format the interpretation 
of the coefficient will be Δy = (b/100) Δ%x. A one percent increase in GDP/capita is 
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associated with an increase in school enrollment rate with somewhere between 1, 5 to 4, 2 
percent units depending on the regression specification.  
When the Gini and ethnic fractionalization coefficients are added the number of 
observations decline. As expected from the hypothesizes the income inequality and 
ethnical diversity coefficients are negatively related to school enrollment rates. The Gini 
data is included in the regression as percentage and the interpretation of the coefficient 
should be Δy = bΔx. An increase in the Gini coefficient with one percentage unit is 
associated with a decrease in school enrollment rate with about 0, 5 percentage units.  
The year dummies are significant and greater for each year, supporting the trend shown in 
the data overview that democracy has increased throughout the world since 1975. The 
regional dummies show that the sub-Saharan Africa and the Latin America coefficients 
have greatly negative and significant signs while the Former Soviet states are highly 
positive and significant. To illustrate, a country in Sub-Saharan Africa is associated with 
18,3 to 20,6 percentage points lower enrollment rate than a country outside the region, 
depending on which democracy index that is used. The positive and significant High-
Income and Middle-Income dummies show that there is a clear difference in school 
enrollment rates between high and low income countries as well as between middle and 
low-income countries. This supports the expectations from the hypothesis that very low-
income level is a hinder for redistribution and thus for education in a country.  
The R2 values for all specifications suggest that the model is useful. The two different 
democracy indexes give consistent coefficient directions and significance levels. 
Government Spending on Education as Dependent Variable 
As a second measure of the education in a country government spending on education is 
used. There are two different ways of measuring government spending, either as 
percentage of total government spending or as percentage of GDP. Firstly the government 
spending on education as a percentage of GDP is the dependent variable and democracy as 
independent variable. This is followed by the same regression only changing dependent 
variable to government spending on education as percentage of total government spending. 
As in the previous section, each set of regressions is performed twice, once for each 
democracy index. Results are displayed in Table 3. 
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Table 3. GLS random effects 
Dependent 
Variable: Gov/GDP Gov/Tot Gov/GDP Gov/Tot Gov/GDP Gov/Tot Gov/GDP Gov/Tot 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
C 3,694*** 15,118*** 4,070*** 15,153*** 2,968*** 10,656*** 3,572*** 11,487*** 
DEMO (FH) 0,206    -0,041   0,217** 0,787   
DEMO (P2)   0,029** 0,006   0,052*** 0,01 
GDP 0,077** -0,056 0,053 -0,068 0,119*** 0,022 0,080*** 0,066 
Gini     0,010 0,063* 0,007 0,0256 
Ethnic     -0,374 3,466* -0,219 4,941** 
R2 0,037 0,008 0,029 0,007 0,127 0,088 0,103 0,073 
N 748 682 679 622 386 348 391 353 
 
The R2 values for all regressions are very low, indicating that independent variables 
explain little of the variation in government spending on education. Furthermore, the sizes 
of the coefficients are much lower than the regressions with school enrollment rate as 
dependent variable. The size and direction of the coefficients for the independent variables 
are similar whether government spending on education is measured as percent of GDP or 
as percent of total government spending. The only exception is the ethnical variable, which 
shows small and negative, but insignificant, values for the percent of GDP while positive, 
greater and significant values for government spending of total spending.  
Based on the results so far, I draw the conclusion that democracy is not a good explanatory 
variable for government spending on education. The following regressions will therefore 
use only school enrollment rate as a dependent variable.  
6.2 Fixed Effects Model 
The random effects regressions performed and displayed in Tables 2 and 3 studied the 
levels of the variables included rather than the changes in the variables. I also want to 
observe the differences in education level between different countries depending on 
democracy. Therefore a fixed effects model will be used. This means that each country is 
given a separate intercept, hence functioning as a dummy variable (Harris et al. 2005). The 
downside of using such a method is the number of freedom values decreases greatly when 
the number of countries is large and the number of observation time points is low. This 
may result in low significance values and inefficient estimates.  
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To control if the dataset is suitable for using fixed effects a Hausman test is performed. 
The null hypothesis is that the coefficients estimated by the efficient random effects 
estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the consistent fixed effects estimator. If the 
null hypothesis is rejected, indicated by significant P-value and Prob>chi2 smaller than 
0.05, then it is suitable to use the fixed effects regression analysis. The results from the 
Hausman test, shown in Table 4, indicate that the fixed effects model is suitable for the 
data material.   
Table 4. Hausman test: Fixed – Random 
Ho: Difference in coefficients not systematic 
 Fixed Random Difference (F-R) 
Democracy (P2) 1,065 1,047 0,018 
Income 2,572 3,335 -0,763 
Gini 0,113 -0,466 0,579 
Prob>chi2 = 0,0000 
 
In order to control for country specific factors I perform the same regressions as in Table 2, 
but change it from random to fixed effects. The results are displayed in Table 5.  
Table 5. GLS fixed effects 
Dependent Variable: Secondary School Enrollment Rate 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
C 39,264*** 46,311*** 37,370*** 42,645*** 51,273*** 45,660*** 
DEMO (FH) 2,439**  1,898  -2,026**  
DEMO (P2)  1,004***  1,065***  -0,098 
GDP 2,981*** 2,325*** 3,485*** 2,572*** 0,813* 0,595 
Gini   0,07 0,112 -0,128 -0,060 
Ethnic   dropped dropped dropped dropped 
Year     Yes Yes 
R2 0,593 0,597 0,528 0,506 0,115 0,085 
N 849 768 416 421 416 421 
 
Studying the first four regressions the R2 values show robust results. The democracy 
coefficients are positive and for most specifications significant. They do however give 
lower coefficients in the fixed effects regressions than the random effects regressions, 
indicating that the effect of democracy on education is greater across countries than it is 
within countries. The income coefficients are positive and significant with similar size as 
the random effects regressions. It is interesting to note that the Gini coefficients are small 
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and insignificant, opposed to the results from the random effects regressions where they 
showed negative and in most regressions highly significant results. This suggests that the 
effect of inequality on education is strong across countries whereas changes within a 
country give little effect. The variable for ethnic fractionalization is dropped in the fixed 
effects regressions since there is only one observation for each country. The same holds for 
the regional dummies and for the income level categories. In the last two regression 
specifications year dummies are added. The model is no longer robust and the coefficients 
are small and insignificant.  
6.3 Interaction Variables 
A third model is applied, adding interaction variables between democracy and the other 
independent variables. This allows investigating how the variables affect the impact 
democracy has on the level of education. The model with interaction variables takes the 
form; 
Educationit = αt + β1Demoi(t-1) + β2[Log(GDP)i(t-1)] + β3Ginii(t-1) + β4Ethnici + β5Demo i(t-1) 
*[Log(GDP)i(t-1)] + β6(Demo i(t-1)*Ginii(t-1)) + β7Demo i(t-1)*Ethnici + εit. (6)  
The three different interaction variables are used in separate regression sets. The results are 
displayed in Table 6. The regressions are performed with random effects since a fixed 
effects model does not allow inclusion of the ethnic fractionalization variable.  
Table 6. GLS random effects 
Dependent Variable: Secondary School Enrollment Rate 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
C 36,108*** 40,483*** 53,893*** 71,080*** 61,104*** 70,351*** 
DEMO (FH) 1,329  8,773*  5,309**  
DEMO (P2)  0,711***  0,420  1,298*** 
GDP 3,067*** 3,568*** 4,051*** 3,345*** 4,054*** 3,346*** 
Gini   -0,257 -0,471*** -0,572*** -0,480*** 
Ethnic   -15,569** -18,486*** -3,699 -16,972** 
DEMO*GDP 0,576*** 0,086***     
DEMO*Gini   -0,149 0,015   
DEMO*Ethnic     -0,576 -0,599 
R2 0,604 0,606 0,634 0,617 0,631 0,620 
N 849 768 416 421 416 421 
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The interaction variables are interpreted as school enrollment rate depending on changes in 
democracy and the level of income. The first two regressions include democracy, GDP and 
their interaction variable. The small but positive and significant interaction coefficients 
indicate that increases in the school enrollment rate due to democracy are stronger in 
countries with higher income. In the following four regressions the Gini and Ethnic 
Fractionalization variables are included as well as the interaction variables for Democracy-
Gini and Democracy-Ethnic Fractionalization respectively. None of these interaction 
variables are statistically significant indicating that the effect of democracy on education is 
not dependent on circumstances such as income inequality and ethnic fractionalization. 
This contradicts the implications of the median voter theorem, rather indicating that 
democracy itself is sufficient to promote education. 
6.4 Cross Lagged Model 
The causality between education and democracy is not obvious as discussed in the 
theoretical section. To control if the assumed impact of democracy on education exists a 
cross lagged model is applied. This means that the dependent variable is included as an 
independent variable in lagged form. The model takes the form:  
Educationit = αit + β1Education(t-1) + β2Democracy(t-1) + εt. (7) 
In this model the level of education is explained by the level of democracy in the previous 
period and controls for the level of education in the previous period. The level of education 
in one period could not have affected the level of democracy in a previous period. This 
means that the model should exclude all effects from education on democracy (Lindgren, 
2006). The results are shown in Table 7.  
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Table 7. GLS random effects 
Dependent variable: Secondary School Enrollment Rate 
 1 2 3 4 
C 3,822*** 6,961*** 4,796* 7,285*** 
School (lagged) 0,952*** 0,953*** 0,891*** 0,881*** 
DEMO (FH) 1,730***  1,094*  
DEMO (P2)  0,163***  0,150** 
GDP   0,620*** 0,642*** 
Gini   0,029 0,027 
Ethnic   -0,663 -1,006 
R2 0,935 0,938 0,934 0,938 
N 869 782 402 406 
 
The large R2 values in the model show a strong correlation between the education level at 
one point of time and in the previous period. The democracy coefficients are positive and 
significant, but smaller than in the random effects regressions. The significant results 
suggest that the expected causality from democracy to education is robust. 
6.5 Summary 
In order to examine the relationship between democracy and education a number of 
regressions have been performed. Each regression was completed twice using two separate 
democracy indexes. The first set of regressions was based on a random effects model with 
secondary school enrollment rates as dependent variable. The model gave robust results. 
The democracy coefficients were positive and statistically significant for all specifications 
but when the year and income group dummies were added. The income variable showed 
positive and highly significant results and the income inequality and ethnic variables were 
negative and in most specifications significant. When the same set of regressions was 
performed with government spending on education as dependent variable the results were 
no longer robust. The coefficients were very small and insignificant and it could be 
concluded that it was not a good model.  
The fixed effects model with secondary school enrollment rate as dependent variable 
showed robust results. The democracy coefficients were positive and for most 
specifications significant. A comparison to the results in the random effects model suggests 
that democracy’s effect on education is vaster across countries than within. The inequality 
coefficients were, in contrast to the random effects model, small and insignificant, 
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indicating that the effect of inequality on education matter to a greater extent across 
countries. When the year dummies were included in the regressions the results were no 
longer robust and the coefficients are small and insignificant.  
A model where interaction variables were included was performed. The interaction 
variable between democracy and income level was small but positive and significant. This 
suggests that increases in secondary school enrollment rates due to democracy are stronger 
in countries with higher income. The interaction variables for democracy-inequality and 
for democracy–ethnic fractionalization were both insignificant. This indicates that the 
democracy’s impact on education is not heavily dependent on circumstances such as 
inequality and ethnic fractionalization.  
Lastly, a cross-lagged model was performed to handle the question of causality. The 
positive and significant coefficients for democracy, even after including the dependent 
variable in lagged form, suggest that democracy has an effect on education. 
The next section provides a discussion on the data materials and the empirical results 
followed by concluding remarks. 
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7. DISCUSSION 
The empirical model tested the impact democracy has on education. The panel data set 
contained a lot of information both over time and across countries. The number of 
observations was high and the use of two separate democracy indexes as well as two 
different measurements of education increased the quality of the study. Although the 
number of observations was high there were many countries excluded from the data set. 
Particularly after including the Gini and Ethnic Fractionalization variables the data became 
limited. Questions concerning the randomness of the missing data are of relevance when 
interpreting the empirical results. Some poor countries are more likely to report data in 
order to be entitled aid and loans while non-democratic countries that are more isolated are 
less keen on reporting.  
Another concern regarding the empirical performance is the quality of the variables. 
Secondary school enrollment rates are used as a dependent variable, but the actual 
attendance rates would have given a truer picture as the enrollment rates may be 
exaggerated. Unfortunately such data was too limited to be used in the analysis.  
The diversity in measurement of education in a country enriched the analysis. While the 
secondary school enrollment rates gave the expected results the regressions with 
government spending on education as dependent variable proved to be a bad model. This 
seemed surprising at first. A possible explanation is that in a low-income country initial 
increases in income may raise the spending on education. But with high-income levels in a 
country there might already be great resources allocated to education, making it possible to 
allocate more resources towards other public services.  
Another explanation to why democracy and income are bad explanatory variables to the 
rate of government spending on education could be the political ideology in a country. 
Independent of if a country is democratic or autocratic, rich or poor, countries prioritize 
public services differently. To illustrate; the USA have high democracy scores and are 
among the richest countries in the world. The Gini coefficient for the US indicates great 
inequality. According to the theory the circumstances are right to create high levels of 
education. The enrollment rates in the USA are high but the government spending on 
education as percentage of total government spending is below world average and 
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measured as percentage of GDP it is only slightly above world average. Priority and 
ideology are possible explanations as the military is an important post in the US state 
budget and private schooling is common. The ideology influence is further illustrated by 
high levels of education in the Former Soviet states. The dummy in the regressions shows 
greatly negative and significant results for this group of countries. There are 14 Former 
Soviet states that report data, and they all show enrollment rates above 82% compared to 
world average on 75%.  
Theoretical models give a simplified picture of the reality. The arguments above point out 
the difficulty in using cross-country and time series analysis. Countries differ greatly in 
many aspects, which make it difficult to compare them. It is a balance to choose the right 
amount of variables to include in the regressions. By including more control variables the 
number of observations declines and the significance in specific coefficients decreases. 
The risk of multicollinearity becomes greater. Meanwhile it is important to be aware of the 
diversity of components that impact the variables in the analysis. Country characteristics 
such as population density and demography may impact the influence democracy has on 
education. Great land areas may make it more complicated and expensive to provide 
schooling. A young country population means that there are less people in the work force 
and more people in need of schooling. Furthermore, colonial history may affect the priority 
of education. Some colonial powers introduced schooling while others did not have such 
focus. Furthermore, the number of democratic years in a row may impact the performance 
of democracy since it means more experience and more developed institutions. 
An interesting observation from the data is that there are two types of non-democratic 
countries that still have very high secondary school enrollment rates. Former Soviet states 
such as Tajikistan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Kiribati, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan show 
low inequality scores but low income levels. The other group of countries with low 
democracy scores but high education levels is oil exporting countries in the Persian Gulf. 
They range high on the world income list, have high enrollment rates but very low 
democracy scores. An immediate explanation would be the richness in oil. However, 
explaining the good performances in the Persian Gulf by resource density is too simplified. 
There are several examples of countries rich in resources that do not follow the same 
pattern, illustrated by countries such as Congo, Colombia, Iran, Nigeria and Venezuela.  
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The discussion above shows on the complexity of the issue. The ideology and politics in a 
country are perhaps more decisive for the education spending in a country than the political 
institutions. The importance of political ideology for the education level in a country is an 
interesting topic for future research.  
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8. CONCLUSION 
Democracy requires the citizens to elect their leaders and make choices about which 
representative they believe will promote their interest. Education enables people to make 
better voting decisions and to hold the government accountable. In a majoritarian voting 
system the low and middle income citizens represent a great percentage of the population 
and hence have great influence over the election results. As education is the best way for 
parents to improve their children’s chances of a better future, it is expected that democratic 
countries will put high priority on schooling. This paper has examined whether democracy 
has a positive impact on education in a country.  
The theoretical models used in the paper imply that democracy promotes education more 
than non-democratic countries do. It further argues that income inequality increases the 
effect democracy has on education, and social fragmentation is expected to have a negative 
effect on the performance of democracy. Lastly, low income in a country decreases the 
impact democracy has on education, as there is less resources to redistribute.  
Whether democratic countries promote education more than non-democracies do was 
tested empirically. The results depend largely on how the level of education is measured. 
When secondary school enrollment rate is used, the democracy coefficients are positive 
and statistically significant with only few exceptions. The results suggest a strong 
correlation between democracy and education independently of which democracy index 
that is used, supporting the theory that democracy has a positive impact on education.  
When education is measured as government spending on education, as percent of either 
GDP or total government spending, the results are no longer robust. This suggests that the 
variables included are not providing a good explanation to variations in the rate of 
government spending on the level of education in a country. These results are similar to 
Tsai’s who found that school enrollment rates and rate of completing school were 
positively related to democracy while government spending on education gave small and 
weakly significant results (2006). This stands in contrast to Stasavage, who found that 
democracy is associated with higher levels of government spending in African countries 
during the period 1980-1996 (2005). 
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The median voter theorem implies that in very unequal societies the poor will be in great 
majority and they will demand more education for their children. Meanwhile ethnical 
fractionalization in countries will make democracy less efficient according to the 
theoretical arguments of political imperfections. While there were direct and negative 
effects from both inequality and ethnical fractionalization on education the interaction 
variables were not significant. This shows that there is no clear support for inequality and 
ethnical fragmentation having an impact on the performance of democracy.   
According to the theoretical arguments, low-income levels have a negative effect on 
democracy’s impact on education. This was supported by the empirical results and further 
emphasized through the positive and significant dummies for high and middle-income 
levels respectively. Furthermore, the great and highly significant regional dummies 
indicate that neighbor effects and country specifics are of importance. 
To summarize, the results from the empirical testing support the relationship between 
democracy and education when it is measured as secondary school enrollment rate. It 
further supports the theory that low income levels in a country lowers the effect democracy 
has on education since there is less to redistribute. Income inequality and social 
fragmentation do however not have clear affects on the impact democracy has on 
education.  
There are several papers that present empirical results that show on how education 
promotes democracy. The theoretical argumentation and the empirical results from this 
paper do not contradict these arguments. It rather proposes that the causality is present in 
both directions. If democracy promotes education and education in its turn promotes 
democracy the two parameters reinforce each other. 
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9. APPENDIX 
Appendix 1. Correlaation Matrix 
 
 
Appendix 2. Breusch Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test. 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Appendix 3. Durbin Watson Test. 
Dependent Variable: SCHOOL   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)  
Date: 10/20/09   Time: 15:52   
Sample (adjusted): 1980 2005   
Periods included: 6   
Cross-sections included: 155   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 808  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 56.88593 0.598010 95.12544 0.0000 
POLITY2(-1) 2.600554 0.079946 32.52881 0.0000 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.567625    Mean dependent var 81.50362 
Adjusted R-squared 0.567089    S.D. dependent var 65.25034 
S.E. of regression 28.56721    Sum squared resid 657765.0 
F-statistic 1058.123    Durbin-Watson stat 0.307181 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.283608    Mean dependent var 57.31225 
Sum squared resid 663014.6    Durbin-Watson stat 0.174179 
     
     
  
 
